Landmark Judgment: SC Clarifies POSH IC Jurisdiction in Inter-Departmental & Third-Party Sexual Harassment Cases

The Supreme Court of India, in the landmark judgment Dr Sohail Malik vs Union Of India (2025 INSC 1415), delivered on December 10, 2025, settled a crucial jurisdictional question under the POSH Act, 2013. This definitive ruling clarifies the scope of the Internal Complaints Committee (IC) jurisdiction when the aggrieved woman and the 'respondent' employee work in different departments or organisations, significantly upholding the protective intent of the law.

Facts of the Case

The central issue in the Dr Sohail Malik case revolved around a fundamental question of authority:

Which IC has the power to investigate a sexual harassment complaint when the two employees involved work in completely different government departments?

The case involved two Central Government employees:

• The Aggrieved Woman (Complainant): An IAS officer working in the Department of Food and Public Distribution, New Delhi. She filed the complaint at the IC constituted in her own department.

• The Appellant (The Respondent): Dr. Sohail Malik, an IRS officer working at the Central Board of Direct Taxes, Delhi (a different department).

  
  

The Appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the aggrieved woman’s IC, arguing that since the Department of Revenue was his controlling authority, only the IC in his department had the authority to hear the complaint, based on a strict reading of Section 11 of the POSH Act. The Appellant lost at the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and the Delhi High Court, leading to the Supreme Court’s definitive ruling.

Supreme Court’s Interpretation: "Where" is a Conditional Trigger

At the heart of the appeal was the pivotal jurisdictional question:

Must POSH complaints always be inquired into by the IC at the respondent’s workplace, or can the IC at the aggrieved woman’s workplace conduct the inquiry?

The Court's answer came through a deep dive into the meaning of the phrase "where the respondent is an employee" in Section 11(1) of the POSH Act:

• The Court firmly rejected the argument that "where" refers to a physical place or departmental jurisdiction.

•  Instead, the Court held that "where" operates as a conditional conjunction—similar to "if" or "in case".

• This clause is merely a procedural trigger instructing the IC to apply the service rules applicable to the respondent; it does not limit which IC may conduct the inquiry.

  
  

The Court underscored that the definitions of "employee," "respondent," and the expansive definition of "workplace" (covering any location visited during employment) are all workplace-neutral and support a broader interpretation.

Upholding the Spirit of the POSH Act

The Supreme Court stressed that the POSH Act is a social welfare legislation. A narrow interpretation that forces an aggrieved woman to approach an IC in the respondent’s department would:

• Cause violence to the general ethos of the POSH Act.

• Create significant procedural and psychological barriers, forcing her to pursue her remedy at an alien or potentially hostile workplace.

• Ultimately defeat the Act’s protective and remedial purpose.

  
  

Thus, the legislative intent clearly supports allowing the aggrieved woman’s IC to take cognisance and proceed with the inquiry.

The Two-Stage POSH Inquiry Mechanism Clarified

To manage the distinction between inquiry and disciplinary action in inter-departmental cases, the Court clarified the roles and responsibilities under a two-stage mechanism:

Stage	Responsible Body	Function
Stage 1: Fact-Finding Inquiry	IC at the Aggrieved Woman's Workplace	Conducts the initial inquiry, gathers evidence, and determines the facts of the complaint under the POSH Act.
Stage 2: Formal Disciplinary Action	Respondent’s Employer/Disciplinary Authority	Upon receiving the Stage 1 report, the respondent's employer issues a chargesheet and initiates formal disciplinary proceedings under applicable service rules (e.g., CCS CCA Rules for government employees).

This mechanism ensures that the aggrieved woman has an accessible forum for inquiry, while the employer who is competent to impose punishment retains the authority for formal disciplinary action. Furthermore, the respondent's employer is statutorily bound under Section 19(f) of the POSH Act to cooperate swiftly with the inquiring IC.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, decisively holding that the IC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace has the jurisdiction to conduct the fact-finding inquiry, regardless of the respondent's departmental affiliation.

While the specific service rules mentioned (CCS CCA Rules, 1965) apply to Central Government employees, the fundamental legal principle established by the Supreme Court—that the IC at the aggrieved woman's workplace holds jurisdiction for the inquiry—applies equally to the Private Sector.

This ruling is critical for private companies, organisations with multiple branches or subsidiaries, and cases involving third-party vendors or contract workers (where the IC functions as the Local Committee's equivalent).

Private sector employers must recognise that if one of their employees is accused by an external party or an employee in a different unit, the IC of the complainant's unit or organisation will likely have the authority to initiate the inquiry. This ensures that all organisations, whether public or private, adhere to the POSH Act's core objective of providing easy and unhindered access to redressal for women employees.